Introduction
For some differential games, it can be shown that there exist equilibrium decision rules that are linear in the current value of the state variables. These types of strategies, called linear Markov strategies, are attractive because of their simplicity and ease of interpretation.
They also greatly facilitate the computation of the equilibrium and of its properties. For these reasons, the analysis is often restricted to this class of equilibria, when they exist.
Notable examples in common property resource games are Clemhout and Wan [1] , Lehvari and Mirman [5] , Plourde and Yeung [7] , Fischer and Mirman [3, 4] , Long and Shimomura [6] and Dockner et al. [2] .
The use of linear Markov strategies is however limited by the restrictions that must be imposed on the primitives of the model in order for such an equilibrium to exist. In this paper, we derive necessary conditions to the use of linear Markov strategies in natural resource differential games.
The model is presented in section 2. In section 3, we derive restrictions that must be imposed on the natural growth function, given the frequently assumed constant elasticity utility function. In section 4, we derive restrictions that must be imposed on the utility function, given a specific natural growth function. In section (5), we briefly discuss an extension to the case where benefit is derived from the remaining resource stock as well as the flow of consumption. We end with some concluding remarks in section 6.
The model
Consider a natural resource that is commonly owned and exploited by n economic agents.
Denote by x(t) the stock of the resource at time t and by c i (t) the rate of harvest of agent
is the natural growth function of the resource stock, then the state variable x(t) evolves according to the differential equatioṅ
It is assumed that agent i derives an instantaneous net benefit u(c i (t)) from his harvest, with u (c i (t)) > 0 and u (c i (t)) < 0.
By assumption, we restrict attention to equilibria in stationary linear Markov strategies.
Stationary Markov strategies in this context are decision rules that specify an agent's harvest rate as a function of the current resource stock: c i (t) = φ i (x(t)). A linear strategy for agent i is a strategy of the form φ i (x(t)) = δ i x(t), with δ i > 0 a constant.
An equilibrium in linear Markov strategies, if it exists, will necessarily have the property that a best response of agent i to linear strategies being played by each of his n − 1 rivals is also a linear strategy. The question then is: What are the minimal restrictions that need to be put on the primitives of the problem (the natural growth function g(x(t)) and the utility function u(c i )) in order for this property to be satisfied?
At equilibrium it will be the case that, taking as given the vector of decision rules
where r i is agent i's discount rate.
The current value Hamiltonian associated to this problem is
where λ i is the shadow value of the resource stock for agent i.
An equilibrium must satisfy, for i = 1 . . . , n, the following set of necessary conditions, in addition to (3) and (4):
Assume φ i (x) = δ i x to be a solution, with δ i > 0. Then, for any x > 0, it will be the case
It also follows that (3) can be rewritten aṡ
Furthermore, from (7) and (8), along an interior solution,
where η(c i ) is the elasticity of marginal utility 1 , given by
Therefore, substituting from (11) and (12) into (10), we find that the following condition must be satisfied in order for c i = δ i x to be a best response:
1 The reciprocal, 1/η(c i ), can be interpreted as the instantaneous elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
where δ i and the δ j 's are constants that remain to be determined.
It follows that, for any given utility function u(c i ), the growth function g(x) must satisfy the following first-order linear differential equation in x:
Alternatively, given a growth function g(x), the marginal utility function u (c i ) must satisfy the following first-order linear differential equation in c i :
Admissible growth functions, given a utility function
Typically, in this type of problem, attention is restricted to the class of utility functions that exhibit a constant elasticity of marginal utility. Denoting by θ > 0 this elasticity, the utility function may then take the form:
which is the limiting case of (17) for θ = 1.
2
In that case, η(c i ) = θ, a constant, and (15) has as a unique general solution:
where k is the constant of integration. Therefore, given a utility function of the form (17) or (18), a decision rule of the form φ i (x) = δ i x will be a best response to decision rules of the form φ j (x) = δ j x, j = i, on the part of i's n − 1 rivals, only if the growth function is of the form:
Substituting from (20) and (17) or (18) into (15), we get the following system of n equations :
which determines the constant equilibrium values of δ i , i = 1, . . . , n. In particular, with identical agents (i.e., r i = r, i = 1, . . . , n), the symmetric equilibrium is given by
The A major drawback however is that unless we restrict the growth function to β = 0, it must depend explicitly on a parameter of the utility function, namely θ, if the decision rule φ i (x) = δ i x is to be a best response to φ j (x) = δ j x, j = i. This also means that unless β = 0 is imposed, heterogeneity over the θ's is not admissible, since the growth function g(x) must be common to all agents, by the very nature of the problem.
Admissible utility functions, given a growth function
Conversely, consider the case where the growth function is known to be of one of the forms in (20), with α, β and θ being known exogenous parameters. Then, from (16), we have that the elasticity of marginal utility must be given by:
It follows that a decision rule of the form φ i (x) = δ i x can be a best response to decision rules of the form φ j (x) = δ j x, j = i, on the part of i's n − 1 rivals only if η(c i ) is of the following form:
Hence the utility function will be of the form:
and the marginal utility function of the form:
where a > 0 and η(c i ) must be given by (24). Strict concavity is assured by imposing
This class of utility functions includes as a special case that specified in (17) whenever A = θC (with b = 0 and a = 1/ (1 − θ) ), or that specified in (18) whenever D = F (with b = 0 and a = 1).
Substituting from (24) into (23), we find that the constant equilibrium solution for δ i ,
and, if g(x) = αx + βx ln x:
In particular, with identical agents, the symmetric equilibrium value of δ will be given, if
and, if g(x) = αx + βx ln x, by:
Notice that if A = θC and D = F , in which case, as noted above, the utility function is of the constant elasticity form (17) and (18) respectively, then (27) and (28) reduce to (21) and (29) and (30) reduce to (22). But the admissible class of utility functions is wider than the constant elasticity class. Again, however, an important drawback is that the parameters of the utility function depend explicitly on the exogenous parameters of the growth function, namely α, β and θ.
An extension
It is sometimes appropriate to have utility depend not only on the flow of consumption of the resource, but also directly on the stock, because of the flow of amenities it may provide. 4 To capture this, assume that agent i derives an instantaneous benefit u(c i (t), x(t)) from those two sources, with u c (c
Then the equivalent of (15) is:
where
are respectively the elasticity of marginal utility of c i with respect to c i and x and
is the marginal rate of substitution between c i and x. Given the function u(c i (t), x(t)), the function g(x) must satisfy the first-order linear differential equation (31) if c i = δ i x is to be a best response.
Consider, as an example, the following version of the constant elasticity utility function, with σ > 0 and θ = 1:
and (31) has as a general 4 We thank Ngo Van Long for suggesting this extension.
solution:
where k is the constant of integration. Hence the growth function has to be of the form:
In particular, if σ = θ, then admissible functions must be of the form
In that case, the utility function is homogeneous of degree one and hence marginal utility of consumption can be written u c (c i /x, 1), which becomes a constant when we set c i = δ i x.
Therefore, from the first-order condition for the maximization of the Hamiltonian, λ(t) must be a constant. It then follows directly from condition (8) that g (x) must be a constant as
well. This will be true of any utility function that is homogeneous of degree one in c and x.
The constant equilibrium values of δ i , i = 1, . . . , n are obtained as the solution to the following system of n equations:
Setting r i = r, the symmetric equilibrium is given by:
The limiting case of (32) for θ = 1, σ > 0, provides an example of the fact that for g (x) to satisfy condition (31), though necessary, is not sufficient for the best response to be linear.
The utility function is then given by: 
which means that admissible growth functions must be of the form:
Substituting for this form of growth function into the differential equation (31), we find that it will be satisfied only if δ i , i = 1, . . . , n, solves:
which involves x. Clearly, for agent i's best response to be linear in x further requires that
]. This in turn requires r i = r for all i, since it is inherent to the problem that the growth function is common to all agents.
Concluding remarks
The above results place in proper perspective models that rely on linear Markov strategies to study the competition over a common property resource, by showing that the parameters of the utility function and of the growth function cannot be chosen independently of one another, but must satisfy a precise relationship. Assigning specific numerical values to the parameters of functional forms that happen to satisfy this relationship -for instance a unit elasticity of marginal utility or a linear growth function -sometimes tends to obscure this fact.
The papers cited in the introduction all assume specific functional forms for the utility function and the growth function that happen to jointly satisfy this necessary relationship.
Clemhout and Wan [1] and Plourde and Yeung [7] both assume a logarithmic utility function as in (18) 
